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EDITORIAL: AN OVERVIEW OF THE U. S. MARITIME INDUSTRY 
~1'y remarks will deal ... /ith three questions: 1) Is the nation's current ship construc-
tion level an accurate indicator of their maritime cap2bilities? 2) Ho':.' is the country's 
aOinestic maritime shipbuilding capability related to its naval pO't/er? 3) ~'Ihy does the 
U. S. I':dl'itime shipbuilding industry occupy such an inferior ':/o'('ld status? 
First, the current increment to each nation's stock of ships should be distinguished 
from the size of its current stock of ships. According to the U. S, Maritime Administra-
tion's Annual Report for FY '69, the world's merchant fleet consists of slightly over 
19,000 ships and the United State's fleet of 2,013 ships is the world's largest, with the 
United Ki~gdom and Japan possessing somewhat smaller merchant fleets. Of course, data on 
a nation's stock of ships must be interpreted carefully. Thus Greece has a registered 
merchant fleet of 1,059 ships, Liberia has 1,652 ships and NOrl<lay 1,240. H,e flo ... , data 
(current ship production) must also be carefully interpreted. Many of the ships currently 
under construction in Japan, for example, will be owned by U. oS. firms but will probably 
be registered in Panama or Liberia for tax purposes. 
Second, there is no obvious relationship between a nation's r,laritime fleet and its 
naval power. Almost half the U. S. Maritime Fleet is currently inactive. Judging from 
data in the MSTS Financial and Statistical Report for the 1st half of FY '70, the availa-
bility of either cargo, refrigerator or tanker ships was apparently never an issue in 
providing logistic support to Vietnam. Further, as in WW II, the U. S. can easily lease 
or charter ships from allied or neutral nations. Of course, the most serious constraint 
upon the U. S. Navy fulfilling its sealift responsibilities in Vietnam has been the availa-
bility of harbor and port facilities. ' 
So try to general i ze to the future: At'e the merchant shi ps currentl y under construc-
tion readily adaptable to future U. S. Navy sealift requirements? Briefly, the answer 
is -- No. The new super-tankers are so large that few world ports can accommodate them. 
There is speculation that off-shore docking facilities will be cheaper to develop than 
dredging deeper channels. More important, almost all new cargo ships under construction 
are container ships. These require very extensive and specialized dock facilities. Hm..,r 
can the U. S. Navy provide a rapid, responsive, large-scale sealift capabiiity in the 
future -- say, 10 to 20 years hence? This is a very important question to ask -- and 
answer effectively -- right now. 
As to the inferior status of the U. S. shipbuilding industry: Com:rast it \'iith the 
U. S. aircraft industry which today is the unquestioned worldls leader. As of 1945 bOoth 
industries were in dominant world positions. But this nation's shipbuilding leadership has 
been relinquished. Why? One answer is that the economics of shipbuilding is such that it 
is far cheaper for us to use the low cost labor in Japan for ship construction. The alter-
native productive opportunities for American labor, such as aircraft. automobiles, machine 
tools, etc., are valued more than shipbuilding. But this reasoning should then also hold 
for aircraft production -- which it, Df course, does not. Why, then is there such a 
disparity? 
In explanation several lines of reasoning can be advanced. For one thing, the U. S. 
Navy, unlike the U. S. Air Force, has developed its major \'Jeapons system with "in-house" 
talent. Thus a major pool of ship design talent within the U; S. has ~ot been free to 
yield its possible joint-product-improved commel'cial ship design. Another possibility: the 
ASPR (Armed Services Procurement Regulation) very effectively hinders the development of 
commercial market opportunities. Under ASPR, U. S. shipbuilders have not had the financial 
encouragement to discover the means of substituting capital for expensive labor in'its 
ship construction techniques. Lastly, it has been suggested that the U. S. Navy's method of 
buying only a few ships from a single shipyard -- uncer a spread-the-v/oY'k pol icy -- has 
prevented the development of low-cost mass production techni~ues. Wh&t is the be~t current 
U. S. Maritime policy? This, too~ is an important question to ask -- and answer correctly 
right now! PROFESSOR P. M. CARRICK 
Dept. of Business Admin. & Economics 
DIRECTED STUDY OPPORTUNITY: Data. cn'e on disl( from 2000 consumer responcents conCerning 
buyer behavior. Professor jol°iy is interested in supe:---vising reseal'ch us;nq these data. 
Subjects in Management and Economics are available (Ext. 2561). -
